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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES N. BENNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsDONNA MAE BENNETT,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for divorce brought by Plaintiff-Appellant,
CHARLES N. BENNETT, against his wife of thirty-one years,
Defendant-Respondent, DONNA MAE BENNETT.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full evidential hearing, the Lower Court granted
a decree of divorce to both parties, set child support, divided the household goods and made an equitable apportionment
of the only two major assets acquired during the 31 years of
marriage.

The family residence equity and the limited work

experience and retirement benefits of Defendant were balanced
by the court against Appellant's Civil Service retirement and
unrestricted right to "double-dip" benefits from additione;l
Soci~l

Security retirement.
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RELIEF

SOU<;i1 l' OIJ

APPEAL

Respondent seeks to have this Honorable Court sustain
the judgment of the Lower Court and an award of attorney's
fees and costs of this appeal on the grounds that the record
made in the Lower Court amply supports the exei:,isc of the
sound discretion of the Honorable H. Maurice Harding in
dealing with the complex questions presented by the division
of property in domestic cases.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent herein will be referred to hereafter as "Wife" and Plaintiff-Appellant as "Husband."
The Husband and Wife herein were married May 31, 1947,
(R-3) and the Wife devoted almost a lifetime to the bearing
and rearing of the parties' four children (R-36) two of
whom were still minors when the Husband initiated (R-11) a
complaint for divorce in the Lower Court.

(R-66).

In the property settlement, the Husband's prior disposition of two family vehicles as a down payment on a newer 1973
station wagon for his exclusive use was approved together with
the Husband's spending of the family savings account for his
own purposes.

(R-5 and R-6).

The Wife was left with the

older family sedan as her only means of transportation to and
from work.

(R-5).

The Wife was awarded the family residence subject to a
lien in favor of the Husband for $5,000.00, the lien to be
-/.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

paid the Husband under the usual conditions but in no event
lat<~r

than January 13, 1986.

In addition to the ,1ward of a

$ 5, tJ 0 0. 0 0 lien on the equity in the parties' residence, the
Husband was awarded all of his personal contributions to his
Civil Service retirement, $15,681.95 (P-75), bringing his
total cash award to $20,681.95.

In performing the difficult

task of apportioning the various equities, the trial court
considered the $9,603.25 of mortgage debt that the Wife was
required to pay to protect her equity award (R-47), the disparity of earning power between the Husband's $18,254.00
annually (R-73) and the Wife's annual income exclusive of
mandatory overtime

~f

$290.00 x 26 pay periods= $7,540.00

(R-53), the overwhelming difference between the Wife's retirement income not ayailable until January 27, 1994, in
the sum of $289.20 per month, $3,468.00 annually (R-64) and
the Husband's $1,215.00 per month, or $14,400.00 annually,
available at his age 65, or even the Husband's smaller retirement of $1,042.00 per month, annually $12,504.00 (R-77).
The court received uncontroverted testimony from an expert
witness that the Husband would also be entitled to draw
Social Security retirement benefits (R-82).

It was the

Husband's testimony that he had worked a second job in addition to his Civil Service job for 29 of the 31 years of
the marriage (R-24).
What the court had to evaluate was the 49-year old
-3-
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Husband, in good health (R-76), who has unrestr·icted access

prior to April 7, 1984 (R-77 and R-80), to $15,681.00 and
the fact that in approximately 15 months after cetirement
at age 55 with 37 years and two months of Federal service
(R-78), will have exhausted

hi~

contribution and will 1 for

his remaining life expectency, continue to draw $1,070.00
per month which he must treat as reportable income for
Federal and State income tax purposes.

If the husband

elects an option to retire, which is wholly within his own
control, at age 55, he will draw totally tax-free income of
$1,070.00 per month until he is approximately 56 1/2 years
of age anct will have this income supplemented by further
Social Security retirement benefits upon his achieving a
suitable age (R-82).

The Wife's testimony and documents

submitted as exhibits was that she will be entitled to a
retirement of $289.20 per month (R-67).

Contrary to the

statement made in the Husband's Brief that, "She would also
be entitled to Social Security Benefits," the Wife testified
that she did not know if this would be in addition to
Social Security benefits (R-67 and R-68).
In establishing the level of child support, the court
had the varying estimates of the Husband's income provid"d
by the Husband (R-24) at $15,300.00 and his reading c." the
pay level of a GSB, Step 9 from the Utah Wage Area Schedule
effective October 29, 1977, of $1.7,302.00

(R-24) and the

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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final testimony of the Wife's expert witness that effective
October 5, 1978, the Husband's gross annual salary is $18,254.00
(R-73).

The court had the Husband's unsubstantiated affidavit

of expenses submitted at trial and the sworn testimony provided by cross examination of the Husband.
ZCHI,

$200.00

(R-29).

The amount owed

The amount owed for the Husband's 1973

station wagon approximately $1,000.00 (R-29).

The amount

owed the federal Employees Credit Union, $900.00 approximately
(R-29).

The amount owed Mental Health, $225.00

(R-29).

On

the question of mandatory deductions for Federal taxes,

the

Husband equivocated ( R- 3 0) •
The parties'

residence was variously appraised at

$4G,500.00, Husband's appraisal, and $48,300.00, Wife's
appraisal (R-5), with the llusband testifying in response
to questions by his counsel he would be satisfied to split
the difference to arrive at a fair-market value (R-5).

The

fair-market value of equitable solution suggested by Hus!Jancl's counsel and accepted by Husband and not subsequently
controverted by the Wife being $47,400.00 (R-5), the unpaid
mortgage balance of $9,603.27

(R-46)

leaving a total equity

of $37,796.75.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE TWO PRINCIPAL
ASSETS ACQUIRED DURING THE PARTIES' THIRTYONE YEAR MARRIAGE.
THOSE ASSETS WERE THE
HUSBAND'S FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT
AND THE EQUITY IN THE PARTIES' RES I DENCE.
THE TRIAL JUDGE EXERCISED PROPER DISCRETION
IN APPORTIONING THE ASSETS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The indisputable evidence presented by Margaret Wood,
Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements Officer, was
that the Husband, upon reaching age 55, would be past his
maximum with 37 years of Federal service and would be eligible to retire.

(R-7 8).

Computing his retirement benefits

on the basis of his October 5, 1978, salary of $18,254.00
produced a monthly retirement at age 55 of $1, 070 .00 for
the rest of the Husband's life.

The same witness testified

that at age 65, the Husband would be eligible to receive a
retirement equal to 80% of his base pay which,

if the Husband

received no further increases in pay, would be an annual sum
of $14,400.00.

(R-78).

The expert witness testified that the Husband's retirement benefits could start as early as May 7, 1984, at which
point the Husband would be beyond his maximum.
was

The testimony

that the Husband's retirement income would be tax free

until he had been repaid the $15, 861.95 which he had contributed by payroll deduction.

(R-78).

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The trial judge s ta tecl that he was considering the
Husbetnd's contributions and "the money that had been paid
into Civil Service retirement which the Husband could only
get if he li veu long enough."

(R-94).

Uteth stettutory authority for the trial court taking
into consicleration the Husband's present interest in an
annuity income to be paid him beginning in May of 1984 is
fou11J. in 30-3-5 UCA 1957 as amended:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may mcike such orders in relation to the children, property, and the parties and the maintenance of the parties and children as may be
equitable***"
The most recent case squarely on point which also delt
with the consideration of a Federal retirement plan having
a value of $29, 000 .00 is Englert v. Englert, 576 P2d 1274
at 1276 (February 1978).

Interpreting 30-3-5 UCA 1957 this

court said,
"It is our opinion that the correct view under
our law is that this encornpcisses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived and that this includes such pension fund
or insurance.
These should be given due consideration along with all other assets, income
earnings and the potential earning capacity of
the parties in determining what is the most
practical, just and equitable way to serve the
best interests of the parties and their children.
(Citing Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79,
296 P2d 977).
II

'l'ha t a Federal Civil Service retirement plan is property
\Illich the parties possess and, in the present case, which was
dCCJUirc.t <lur incr tile 31 yecirs of tl1eir marriage cannot be
.:.0ri011~;J.y

r1i~~putec1.
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The trial judge had clear evidence of the differences
be tween the parties' incomes.

From the testimony provided by

the expert witness from Hill Air Force Base, the Husband's
annual salary as of October 5, 1978, was $18,254.00.
The Wife provided evidence which was not controverted at
trial that her gross, bi-weekly pay was $290.00.

The true

nature of the disparity between the parties' future earning
capacity or retirement income was illustrated by the Hill
Air Force Base expert who testified that the Husband's retirement income at age 65 would be 80% of salary.

On a

current salary basis, the court verified that the Husband
would, at age 65, be entitled to an annual retirement
benefit of $14,400.00.

(E-78).

The Wife, on the other

hctnu, woulu ctchieve ct max.inium of $289.00 monthly retirement
based on a projected salary still five years in the
future.

The Wife must wait until May 27, 1994, before such

benefits would be payable.
49 years old.

(R-67).

At present the Wife is

There is, then, a substantial record to sup-

port the modest adjustment of equity which the trial judge
made between the parties.
The question of the 49-year-old Husband being disabled
is raised here for the first time on appeal.

At trial, the

Husband affirmed that while his health was basically good,
he was not able to work sixteen hours per day as he alleged
he had done up until two years before he initiated his com-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaint for divorce.

The trial judge who heard the Husband's

voice inflections and observed his demeanor in response to
questions from his counsel, believed the Husband when he
asserted that his health was good.
record are illustrative.

Two excerpts from the

(R-22).

Counsel (for Husband):
"Basically your health
is good, but not such that you could work
sixteen hours a day?"
Husbcincl:
"Well, not really.
I have emphysema,
Pete, some, yes, and i t bothers me quite a
bit. II
At a later point when counsel for the Wife attempted to
elicit from the Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements
Officer information regarding whether or not the Husband
would gain additional advantages by seeking a disability retirement,

the Husband's counsel again affirmed the Husband's

good heal th.

(R-7 6).

Counsel (for Wife):
"If he were to take a
disability retirement today, can you tell
me what his benefits would be?"
Counsel (for Husband):
"It's irrelevant.
Has no bearing. There's no testimony before this court as to the plan of taking
ci disability.
Quite the contrary. His
heal th is good."
(Emphasis supplied-.-)'.Ch8 court:

"Sustained."

Ttw nusband appears to object to the trial judge con-

sidering any value to him in his Federal Civil Service retirement bGyond that expressed by the $15,861.95 which he
paid into the plan.

The Husband is, on the other hand,
-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

quite willing to claim half of the original $12,500.00 paid
for the home, half of the improvements and half of the
appreciation.

(R-5).

Such a position is clearly ambivalent,

The record strongly supports the division made by the trial
judge.

( R- 3 3 an::l R- 3 4) •

Tho court:
Husband:
The court:

"How much did your home cost?"
"Originally?"
"Yes."

Husband:
"I think we paid twelve-five originally
for the home."
The court: "It is now appraised for nearl
times that.·"
(Emp asis supplied.
Husband:
The court:

·four

"Yes."
"Have you made lots of improvements?"

llusl.J<.md:
"We put on a family room at the expense
of over thirteen thousand: new roof, new
siding, storm windows and doors, a new
fence in back, cinder block fence."
The court:

"Very well, thank you."

The trial judge exercised logical discretion in
dealing with the complex decision necessary to arrive at
an equitable apportionment of the parties' two major assets, and his judgment should be sustained by this court.
At page seven of the Husband's Brief, it is asserted
that the Wife's Telephone Company retirement of $3,468.00
per year will be supplemented by Social Security.
Husband adduced no such evidence at trial.

The

The only re-

ference to the question in the trial record is a statement
-10-
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from the Wife on cross examination that she does not know
whether or not her retirement plan is coordinated with
Social Security.

(R-67 and R-68).

The trial judge demonstrated a grasp of both of the
parties' potential for additional income from Social
Security.

'l'he question of the value of the Husband's

contributions to Social Security during the 29 years he
worked a second job was before the court at R-79.
The court:
"I will take judicial notice that
Social Security is 6.15%."
Counsel (for Husband):
"I think it's a little
higher than six now."
The court:

"6.15."

Counsel (for Husband):
"Would the court also
take judicial notice that back in 1947 it
was probably about 3 1/2%?"
'£he court:

"It was a whole lot less."

Counsel (for Husband) :

"Yes."

The court:
"It starts out, I think, at one
percent."
The Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements Officer
testified regu.rding the Husband's right to draw both Civil
Service retirement and Social Security as follows:

(R-8 2) ,

counsel (for Wife) : "To your knowledge, is
there anything in the Federal Retirement
Regulations that would preclude an employee
from drawing both his Federal retirement,
at over $1,200.00 a month, and whatever
Social Security he might be eligible for?"
!1rs. woods:
"He may draw both, sir, if he's
eligible for both."
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Counsel

(for Wife) :

Mrs. Woods:

"Are you sure of that?"

"Yes , sir ,

I am. "

Considering all of the facts,

the modest award made by

the trial judge to the Wife, who had not sought to terminate
the marriage nor threatened the Husband, takes into account
the re la ti ve guilt of the parties as i t was perceived by the
trier of fact from statements and demeanor of the parties.
It was the Ilusband who indicated to the court that the matter
would go forward with each party alleging minimum grounds.
( R-2) •

The lower court's approval of the agreement as to

grounds precludes the issue raised for the first time on
appeal as to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties
for the collapse of the marriage.

The Husband having raised

the issuu of relative quil L, here should be noted that when
he was qucs tioned by his counsel regarding the Wife's possession of his handguns and arrununition, the Husband did not
deny having threatened the Wife.

The Husband limited his

denial to having threatened the Wife with a gun.

(R-15).

Counsel (for Husband): ·"Have you ·ever
threatened your wife physically, or
threatened her with a gun, that she
would have any fear of that?"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Husband:
"Not with a gun, no.
Bes ides,
the ammunition that she has taken with
this pistol doesn't fit this pistol,
anyhow.
So the ammunition that she
took was 500 rounds of .357 ammunition,
and the pistol she took was a .22 calibre,
so they won't even fit."
The Wife abided by the prior agreement as to minimum
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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grounds and offered no detailed history of marital conflict
or physical violence relying on the trial judge's opportunity
to observe the demeanor of both parties as they gave their
testimonies.
The trial judge followed the established case law in
ap[Jraising all of the circumstances of the parties.

The

case on which both par ties rely is Wilson v •. Wils·on, 5 Utah
2d.

79,

296 P 2d 177 (1956)

at page 979 and 980.

"In doing so it is necessary for the court to
consider, in addition to the relative guilt or
innocence of the par ties, an appraisal of all
of the attendant facts and circumstances; the
duration of the marriage; the ages of the parties;
their social positions and standards of living;
their health; consideration relative to children;
the money and propert¥ they possess and training
and their present and otential incomes.·"
(Citing
for ot er lists o
factors to e consi ered p·inion
v. Pinion, 92 Utu.h 255, 67 P2d 265; MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066, 1071).
( t:rnplws is supplied.)
'l'lw llusband cites in his Brief the case of Martinett v •.
l'lartine tt,
'.o i

8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821 (1958), for the propo-

Li01t tit, it the trial j uclyc wus unjust in his ruling.

The

Husband's Brief admits at page 9 that equity and justice are
de tcrmincd by the facts of each case.

In the present case,

eviclc11cc '"1ppor- ts the determine\ tion made by the trier of fact.
1.h<'

nLl tion.-i l InsurancG Commissioners Standard Ordinary

i•iortality Table, 1958, indicates a life expectancy at the
Husband's age 55 of an additional 21 years;

By exercising

his option to retire at age 55, the Husband will receive a
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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monthly income of $1,070.00.

In the first fifteen months

after re tiring, the Husband will have withdrawn an amount in
excess of his present contribution of $15,281.95.

Every

fifteen months thereafter the Husband will be paid an adIn less than three years from age 55

ditional $16,050.00
to 58,

l:he f!uslJand will have withdrawn $32,100.00 in monthly

retirement benefits.

The total potential withdrawal over

the 21 yec1rs of the Husband's life expectancy exceeds
$269,000.00.
money thil t

The taking into account by the trial judge of

the BuslJand could receive only if he lives long

enough is well founded in the evidence adduced at trial
and should be sustuincd.

Nothing in Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis,

14 Utuh 2cl 273, 382 P2d 412, suggests any other result.
'£Ile lluslJc.tnd seeks

bu lancing of

to charucterize the trial judge's

the relative equities between the parties in

l:lte property settlement as il deduction of $15,682.00 from

the Husband's share of the $38,000.00 equity in the parties'
home.

(lZ-89).

It would be vustly more accurate to character-

ize the settlement as the lower court's view of the present
value of tl1e Husband's future benefits from Federal Civil
Service retirement.

( R- 9 2 and R- 9 4) •

'l'he fact that the Husband will have been repaid all of
his contributions to Civil Service retirement and his remaining income will become reportable income for State anJ
Federal tax purposes within as little as fifteen months
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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after he retires shows the wisdom of the trial judge in
taking into account "money 1·1hich he will receive only if
he lives long enough."

(R-80).

It is more advantages to

have a large retirement income on which one pays State and
Fe~eral

tax than a small income from whatever source that

provides a bare existence but is tax exempt.
POINT II
'l'lll:: 'l'lUAL COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT
MEETS BOTH STATUTORY AND EVIDENTUARY REQUIREMENTS, IS EQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE
SUSTAINED.

The Utah Uniform Civil Liabilities for Support Act
specifies, without imposing a limitation,

certain matters to

be considered by a trial judge in setting a level of support.
78-45-7 (2)

UCA 1957 as amended 1977 provides in part:

"***the court in determining the amount of
prospective support, shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation
of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the need of the obligee;
the age of the parties;
the responsibility of the obliger for
the support of others."

The trial record shows that in addition to the factors
enumerated above, the court had evidence as to the marital
debts assumed by each of the parties albeit the Husband did
not supply evidence as to whether or not the monthly paymcnts of marital debts which he claimed would last for more
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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than one month at the rate of repayment claimed.

The

ability of each of the parties to earn was before the court
in the case of the Husband on his recollection that he earned
$15,300.00 annually,

then upon his reading of his salary froo

the chart at $17,302.00

(R-24) and finally on the testimony

of the Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements

Offic~

that the Husband's earnings as of October 5, 1978, were
$18,254.00.

(R-7 3).

Evidence given by the Wife established the family's
living standard, her regular and limited overtime earnings
and t:l'E needs of the children.

In particular, the uncon-

tcs tcd evidence from the Wife was that the family's basic
necessity budget was currently being supplemented by the
eJ.n1inys o[ tile parties' 15-year-old son.

The record and

statute fully support the trial judge's increase of the
prior temporary order for support from $300.00 per month
to a total award of $350.00 per month.
CONCLUSIONS
The Husband has failed to meet his burden of proof regarding his cli.lim that the trial judge abused his discretion
in making an award of $5,000.00 as the Husband's share of ilie
equity in the parties' residence rather than the $11,159.00
which the Husband seeks on appeal.

The record made in the

lower court is totally consistent with prior case law and
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fully supports the exercise of discretion by the trial judge
in evaluating the money that the Husband will receive from
Civil Service retirement in addition to that which he has
paid by way of employee contributions.
The increase in child support from $300.00 per month
total to 5350.00 per month taken together with the clear
evidence tlla t the Wife was working to support the children,
the llusbcincl had received an increase in annual salary of
nearly $1,000.00 more than at the time the temporary order
was entered, and the children were in need of additional
support for necessities not possible at $300.00 per month
is on

Cl

LL foui:-s with tile mos l recent pronouncements of this

CO\LLL.

'l'ilcc llu:~J_ic1nu hc1s cons.Lrucd the sµecificity with which
tile trictl judyc stated tl1e basis for his award of more of
the el1ui ty in the par ties' home to the Wife than to the
Husband as a challenge to this court.
o[

The particularity

the tr ictl judge in apportioning the two principal assets

becween the parties is more accurately an invitation to
bu th counscd to consiuer carefully the case of Englert V.
lcnqlc1-t,

576 P7.c1 127'1 ilt 1276

(February 1978).

In vie1-1 of the dispropoi:-tionate financial circumstances
of the parties,

the fact that the Husband takes the position

o[ plaintiff in seeking to dissolve a marriage of 31 years,
iHicl

the fact that the instant case is so completely within
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the holding of the Englert case, it is requested that the
sum of $500.00 as attorney's fees on appeal plus costs on
appeal be awarded the Wife.
For the reasons previously set out in the several
paragraphs above, the judgment of the District Court should
be affirmed in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
'I

,,: l.

'u

~{

·.,

J,

Val Roberts
"
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent

J.
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